

# 1<sup>st</sup> International Conference on Applications of Radiation Science and Technology ICARST 2017

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# Upgrading safety and security of gamma irradiation facilities – possibilities and limitations



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## Overview


- General
- Factors influencing safety and security
- Upgrading - Possibilities and limitations
- Security
- Makes me headache

## General Safety / Security



### Safety

Protect people  
from hazards



### Security

Protect the facility  
from attacks by (bad)  
people



### Sometimes contradicting requirements

Safety: Unhampered escape route for staff members

Security: No access from outside

## General



### A gamma irradiation facility seen in Asia (several years ago):

Access control to the irradiation room consisted of a simple chain and a red warning light only.

- No locked access door
- No light barrier
- No step plate
- No mechanical or electrical interlock with the source hoisting system




## Factors influencing safety and security



### What factors do influence safety and security?

- Technical factors (self-acting or to be used deliberately)
  - Interlock of access and of source hoisting system
  - Burglar alarm system
  - Personal dosimeters
- Organizational factors
  - Education and training of staff
  - Working and safety instructions
- SAFETY/SECURITY CULTURE
  - General attitude and behavior with respect to safety and security

## Factors influencing safety and security



## Upgrading - Possibilities and Limitations



### Upgrading technical factors

Simply follow existing recommendations, standards, rules  
(IAEA, international, national)

Easier said than done!

- Lack of funds
- Lack of education or knowledge
- Lack of safety and security culture



What can be done?

Is it part of the mission of the Agency to take care of such lacks  
(asked or unasked)?



## Upgrading - Possibilities and Limitations




### Upgrading organizational factors

Simply follow existing recommendations, standards, rules  
(IAEA, international, national)

Easier said than done!

- Lack of knowledge
- Lack of safety and security culture (willingness to follow instructions)
  - Use of safety belts in cars
  - Stop at red traffic lights
  - Obey speed limits
- (Lack of funds)






# Upgrading - Possibilities and Limitations SAFETY CULTURE



What is it?

What is it?

Worksite power distribution



## Upgrading - Possibilities and Limitations SAFETY CULTURE



### What may be the reasons?

- Fast developing industry – industry grows faster than development of regulations
- Insufficient enforcement of safety regulations in daily life (street traffic, electrical safety, ...)
- It is “normal” not to obey regulations
  - Comparable to a kind of carelessness regarding cleanness (e. g. throwing rubbish out of the moving car)
  - Different cultural background at different places of the world



## Upgrading - Possibilities and Limitations SAFETY CULTURE



### Improvement of safety culture (at least in a GIF)

- Education of staff to understand threats
- Provide positive examples of high safety culture
- Exchange of staff to demonstrate that a high safety culture must (and can) be the normal case



## Security



### **Possible targets of attacks**

- Destroy or damage the facility to spread fear
- Theft of radioactive sources to abuse them for terroristic purposes

### **Intrinsic security against theft of radioactive sources?**

- Access to the facility
- Tools for source handling → can be locked
- Shielding container → heavy
- Crane → can be blocked
- Know how (insider knowledge)

## Security



### However!

Terrorist may be ready to sacrifice his own life (suicide attack) to get a radioactive source for later abuse

- Get access to the facility
- Dive into the pool and grab a source
- Carrying the source out of the facility to a shielding container for further transport

Makes theft simpler

- No or just simple tools for source handling needed
- Shielding container remains outside the facility
- No crane needed

[C. J. Hartwigsen; WINS Workshop; 2016]



## Security



### **Some know how is required**

- How to get access to the facility
- Localization and identification of the radioactive sources
- How to handle the source in an “appropriate way”

### **Possible sources of know how**

- Insiders
  - Voluntary
  - Blackmailing
  - Force of arms
- Other

## Security



### Against intruders

- Early detection of intruders
- Delay of the intruders
- Timely response to stop intruders action before reaching their goal

### Against involvement of insiders

- Two-man rule to get access to sensitive areas
- Keeping automatically records of who has done what
- Limitation of rights to the required minimum

### Security culture

- Limitation of the communication to outsiders



## Makes me headache



### Cheap - cheaper - cheapest culture

- Purchase price of a plant is often considered the most important point
  - Rather than quality of the product
  - Rather than cost / benefit ratio
  - Rather than quality of service
  - Rather than safety/security level
- Is it due to the lack of funds?
  - Maybe, in some cases
  - However, most of the investors never would buy the cheapest car they can get



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**Thank you !**

